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1. Introduction
Real life situations where we must deal with strings tying objects and passing through holes appear from time to time
in very different contexts. Examples range from tying shoelaces, to handling ropes in a sailboat or organising the cable
connections map inside an oﬃce, a building or a whole city. Although humans show an amazing intuition for solving
problems of this nature, a formal representation for reasoning about holes and strings is still a relatively unexplored area.
To understand the complexity of this problem, note for instance that using a fully detailed mathematical model of the
involved objects (assuming them as rigid) does not seem feasible for computational purposes, let alone when we consider
deformable objects like a string. Moreover, humans typically describe solutions to spatial reasoning problems in terms of
qualitative descriptions instead. This is, in fact, the orientation followed by Qualitative Spatial Reasoning (QSR) [1–3], a ﬁeld
that attempts the logical formalisation of spatial knowledge based on primitive relations deﬁned over elementary spatial
entities. In general QSR approaches, however, lack a formal treatment of actions and change (apart from a few exceptions
[4,5]). The formal treatment of actions are of central interest to the Reasoning about Actions and Change (RAC) community
[6,7]. In this work we formalise a spatial domain from the perspective of RAC, aiming to provide a step in the direction
of a rigorous treatment of reasoning about actions, change and qualitative space. This work falls within the logic-based
knowledge representation subﬁeld of Artiﬁcial Intelligence [8,9], whose main goals are: the logical formalisation of reasoning
processes capable of inferring knowledge from representations of the world; the construction of a medium for pragmatically
eﬃcient computation, in which the formal representation provides the means to organise domain knowledge allowing for
eﬃcient (and consistent) queries, updates and revisions of the knowledge base; or the rigorous treatment of ontological
commitments, which provide the base rules that guide reasoning about the world (for instance, what should or should not
be considered as the effects of actions, to which extent should ramiﬁcations of these effects be considered, how to assume
the persistence of objects through time and so on) [10]. In particular the problem of correctly inferring the effects (and
non-effects) of actions has received much attention by the AI community under the heading of the Frame Problem.
In a nut-shell, the challenge of solving the Frame Problem is to ﬁnd a compact representation of the non-effects of
actions, such that the complexity of the representation is at the order of the number of actions in the domain, and not
of the number of domain elements times actions. Much solutions to this problem were related to the development of
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P. Cabalar, P.E. Santos / Artiﬁcial Intelligence 175 (2011) 346–377 347non-monotonic reasoning formalisms [11] and the deﬁnition of a law of inertia, which states that actions do not change
properties of a domain unless explicitly written [12]. Attempts to solve the Frame Problem stumbled on the existence of
multiple possible models for sound domain representations, some of which were counter-intuitive as exempliﬁed by the
so-called Yale Shooting problem [13]. In this work we tackle the formalisation of a spatial scenario within a logic that has
built into it an elegant solution to the Frame Problem as one of its ontological commitments, as exempliﬁed in the simple
solution to the Yale Shooting scenario presented in Section 4.
To obtain a suitable representation of spatial domains containing strings and holes we have adopted the following
methodology. We begin from speciﬁc formalisations of particular scenarios, what usually implies a more abstract and simpli-
ﬁed description level, and advance then towards more general representations to cover different domains, what necessarily
implies a more ﬁne-grained ontology. As a starting point, puzzle-like examples constitute a good test bed, as they offer a
small number of objects while keeping enough complexity for a challenging problem of knowledge representation. Thus,
puzzles involving physical objects are our drosophila,1 i.e. our base line from which we develop AI research.
In this paper, we take as a starting point the work developed in [16], which presented an automated solution to the
classical puzzle called Fisherman’s Folly introduced below. The approach taken in [16], however, falls short on the formal
treatment of ﬂuents, actions and the problematics surrounding these concepts (such as inertia). The present paper tackles
these issues by presenting a formalisation of the Fisherman’s Folly puzzle into an Equilibrium Logic version of the Situation
Calculus (SC). Here Situation Calculus [17,6] provides the syntactical tools to formalise the domain and Equilibrium Logic
[18], a suitable semantics to the problem, which identiﬁes its minimal models by means that resemble circumscription [19,
20]. We shall deal with these concepts in more details below.
In this context, the original contributions of the present work include the following:
• a novel formalisation of the Situation Calculus in Equilibrium Logic. The main advantage of this formalisation over the
traditional classic logic SC is the ﬁrst-order encoding of predicate extension minimisation providing a rigorous solution
to the frame problem (which in classic logic is accomplished by a fragment of the second-order calculus);
• the ﬁrst logical formalisation of a scenario composed of a string and rigid objects (hosting holes or not). This formalisa-
tion allows the representation of string segments, as well as their creation (and annihilation), depending on the action
evoked. It is worth mentioning that the necessity to handle fragments of objects in this way brings a new challenge to
Knowledge Representation formalisms;
• in this paper we deﬁne a notion of connectivity as a ﬂuent within an action formalism (the ﬂuent linked in Section 5.1),
an issue that has not been considered before in the ﬁeld of Qualitative Spatial Reasoning.
1.1. The Fisherman’s Folly puzzle
The elements of the Fisherman’s Folly puzzle are a holed post (Post) ﬁxed to a wooden base (Base), a string (Str), a ring
(Ring), a pair of spheres (Sphere1, Sphere2) and a pair of disks (Disk1,Disk2). The spheres can be moved along the string,
whereas the disks are ﬁxed at each string endpoint. The string passes through the post’s hole in a way that one sphere and
one disk remain on each side of the post. It is worth pointing out that the spheres are larger than the post’s hole, therefore
the string cannot be separated from the post without cutting either the post, or the string, or destroying one of the spheres.
The disks and the ring, in contrast, can pass through the post’s hole.
In the initial state (shown in Fig. 1(a)) the post is in the middle of the ring, which in its turn is supported on the post’s
base. The goal of this puzzle is to ﬁnd a sequence of (non-destructive) transformations that, when applied on the domain
objects, frees the ring from the other objects, regardless their ﬁnal conﬁguration. Fig. 1(b) shows one possible goal state.
A crucial observation is that the puzzle actually deals with four holes: the post hole, the ring hole and the two sphere
holes. Note that in a natural language description we would probably identify holes with their host objects, saying that “the
string passes through the sphere” (hole) or that “the post passes through the ring” (hole). Furthermore, we would talk about
“sliding the ring up the post,” rather than “moving the post down through the ring hole”.
We argue that the complexity imposed by the (possibly inﬁnite) states of the string allied to the necessity of handling
void space (holes) makes spatial puzzles such as Fisherman’s Folly rich benchmark domains to be tackled from the Common
Sense Knowledge Representation standpoint [21,8]. Moreover, besides the fact that this problem involves both Reasoning
about Actions and Change and Qualitative Spatial Reasoning about objects (that are ubiquitous in various everyday domains),
there are a number of versions of puzzles involving strings and holes.2 Making use of these analogous puzzles we can
check whether the representation and reasoning methods developed for one puzzle could be applied to other of its variants, thus
verifying the elaboration tolerance [22] of our formalisation.
In this paper we show that the same formalism developed to solve the Fisherman’s Folly puzzle solves other puzzles:
the Rope Ladder puzzle – Fig. 2 (whose solution is presented in Section 7) and the Tricky Dick puzzle (cf. Appendix C). The
way the proposed formalism could be easily applied on distinct domains suggests that the proposed solution is tolerant to
elaborations. However, we make no claim that the work developed here can solve any problem involving strings, holes and
1 Following the metaphor used in [14] and [15].
2 E.g. http://www.puzzlethis.co.uk/products_mad_cow.htm (last accessed in 12/10/2009).
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Fig. 2. The Rope Ladder puzzle in its initial state.
rigid objects. For instance, the formalism is not capable of representing the case of a number of rings interlocking (such as
in the symbol of the Olympic games), puzzles where string loops (or knots) are relevant to the solution, and so forth.
At this point it is worth mentioning some previous work on dealing (separately) with holes and strings from a formal
standpoint. Reasoning about holes and holed objects have been discussed in detail in [23] and [24], whereby a formal
ontology for these entities, based on their topological aspects, is developed. In the present work we assume holes as sharing
the same level of existence as rigid objects, i.e., they are reiﬁed individuals that can be involved in actions. In the present
paper we are mostly interested in how these entities could be engaged in actions, leaving aside some aspects of their precise
ontology. A ﬁne grained spatial ontology of the Fisherman’s Folly (following the guidelines proposed in [23]) is presented in
[25].
The problem of incorporating knowledge about strings and string manipulation has been tackled in [26,27] where a
robotic system capable of learning to tie a knot from visual observation is proposed – this system is called the Knot Planning
from Observation (KPO) paradigm. In KPO each state of a string is represented by a matrix encoding its segments, which are
deﬁned by the portion of the string that lies in between its endpoints and points where it crosses over itself. Actions on
ﬂexible objects in this context were deﬁned as an extension of the Reidemeister moves in knot theory [28]. This representa-
tion is suitable for the identiﬁcation of string states from a computer vision system; however, it falls short in the context of
problem solving, which is the main purpose of the present paper. In contrast to the work proposed in [26], we do not take
into account knots in this paper. Incorporating some of the ideas of the KPO paradigm in our work shall be investigated in
the future. Nonetheless, research on knot planning and reasoning about strings and holes are some of the issues that the
growing community of robot assisted needle steering are interested about [29].
This paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents an early solution to the puzzle in order to provide the intuitions
behind the present development; Section 3 introduces Equilibrium Logic; Situation Calculus theories written in Equilibrium
Logic are developed in Section 4, while Section 5 presents the formalisation of Fisherman’s Folly in this version of Situation
Calculus. The correctness of the developed formalism is discussed in Section 6; Section 7 presents a formal solution of a
more complex version of the Fisherman’s Folly puzzle and Section 8 concludes this paper. Appendices A, B and C present,
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respectively, the Prolog code of the planner developed following the guide lines presented in the paper, the proofs of this
paper’s propositions and a formal solution of a third puzzle.
2. A simple automated solution to the Fisherman’s Folly puzzle
The formalisation of Fisherman’s Folly presented in this paper is based on a simple automated solution of the puzzle
proposed in [16], brieﬂy presented in this section to provide the intuitions behind this work.
The simple solution presented in [16] relies on distinguishing the puzzle’s objects into three sorts: holes (which includes
the post hole, the ring hole and the holes through the spheres), long objects (that includes the string and the post), and
regular objects (including all the remainder objects). For each hole h, its faces are distinguished: h− and h+; and for each
long object l its tips l− and l+ are deﬁned.
The domain objects are represented by the following constants: Disk1, Disk2 (for the left and right disks), Base (repre-
senting the square base), Ring, Sphere1, Sphere2, PostH (representing the holed objects), and Str and Post, for the so called
long objects: the string and the non-holed part of the post (as shall be discussed further on the paper).
For helping the reader to ﬁgure out a puzzle state, we use schematic representations like the one in Fig. 3, which shows
the initial state. Arrows correspond to segments of long objects, deﬁned between pairs of hole crossings, or between a hole
crossing and a tip. These arrows point in the direction from tip l− to tip l+ of a same long object l. Ellipses represent holes
and boxes are linked regular objects. The positive face of a hole implicitly corresponds to the “visible” side of the ellipse.
Central to this simple solution is the deﬁnition of a list data structure named chain(X). This data structure repre-
sents the sequence of all hole crossings on a long object X , when traversing X from its negative tip to its positive
one. For instance, the state shown in Fig. 3 is represented by the following two chains: chain(Post) = [Ring+] and
chain(Str) = [Sphere1+,PostH+, Sphere2+]. The former represents that the long object Post crosses the ring hole and the
latter states that the string crosses the hole on the sphere 1, the post hole and the hole on the sphere 2, respectively. Note
that, for brevity, only the outgoing hole faces are shown, following the direction negative to positive tip.
An action pass was deﬁned3 to represent the movements of puzzle objects. The effects of pass either add or delete a
hole crossing from the chain on which it is applied.
Using these deﬁnitions, a solution to the Fisherman’s Folly puzzle can be represented by the sequence of chains shown
in Fig. 4, whereby each state is identiﬁed by its sequence number plus the pair of lists chain(Post) and chain(Str) in this
order. Note that State 5 has actually reached the goal since, at this point, the ring hole Ring does not occur in any list, i.e.,
it is not crossed by any long object.
In [16] we also present an iterative deepening planning system that manipulates chains in order to ﬁnd a solution to the
puzzle.
This early approach, however, completely overlooks any formal aspects of the domain or the system. This lack of formality
implies on a number of drawbacks. First, there was no possibility of proving the correctness of the automated solutions
obtained, since we did not have available the mathematical tools to analyse the system. Second, there was no proper
ontology of the domain, the simple chain deﬁnition did not allow any such formal deﬁnition. Amongst the deﬁnitions we
would like our theory to capture are the spatial properties of objects as three-dimensional regions (including holes). Besides
spatial properties, a formalisation of a spatial puzzle should have a rigorous treatment of actions and change, including the
indirect effects of actions, the deﬁnition of non-executable actions and the eﬃcient representation of actions’ non-effects
(issues that are virtually impossible to address given the early list-based representation). In contrast, the present paper
proposes a rigorous logical account for the Fisherman’s Folly puzzle, from which its solution can follow as a logical proof.
3 In [16] two actions were deﬁned, one representing the movement of rigid objects and another the movement of holed objects. As we will see later, in
the current paper these two actions will be replaced by a single one for passing a bundle of elements through a hole. Fig. 4 actually shows the solution in
terms of this new representation.
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Moreover, the relational nature of the formalism allows for the deﬁnition of the spatial extent of objects (some of which are
deﬁned and used in this paper, as we shall see). On top of all, the theory proposed is deﬁned on a well-known reasoning
about actions and change formalism, which carries built into it a complete account of the problematics surrounding rigorous
deﬁnitions of dynamic domains.
3. First-order equilibrium logic
There exist several alternatives for incorporating non-monotonicity in a formalism for Reasoning about Actions and
Change (RAC). One possibility is using Predicate Circumscription [19], so that, we deﬁne a set of auxiliary predicates4
and then minimise their extent using a particular circumscription policy – that is, deciding which predicates are ﬁxed, min-
imised or freely varied; deciding which parts of the theory are circumscribed and which parts are not, etc. These decisions
have proved to be a non-trivial task. In fact, it can be said that the area of RAC has evolved by a continuous proposal, and
later solution, of motivating examples showing counterintuitive results from an inadequate circumscription or minimisation
policy.5
Another possibility for formalising action domains that has recently gained some popularity is the use of Logic Program-
ming (LP) as an underlying logical devise, and in particular, the methodology proposed in [35] that relies on the Stable
Models semantics [36]. The advantages of LP are that: (1) default negation provides a natural way for representing defaults
and, in particular, the inertia law for solving the frame problem; and (2) unlike classical material implication, program
rules provide a directional behaviour very convenient for representing causal effects and, in particular, for avoiding the
ramiﬁcation and qualiﬁcation problems in a straightforward way.
Traditionally, there has not been much work in combining Situation Calculus with LP under stable models semantics
(as a pair of exceptions [37,38]). Perhaps the main reason for this was the need to resort to a ground theory, i.e., stable
models was essentially a propositional formalism. This limitation, however, has drastically changed in the last years, thanks
4 Many of them have been used in the literature, like Clipped [30], Abnormal [13,31], Occluded [32], Causes [33], Affects [7], etc.
5 Consider, for instance, the minimal abnormality policy in the Yale Shooting Problem [13] or in the Ramiﬁcation Problem as in [34], the chronological
minimisation in the Stanford Murder Mystery [31], etc.
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order theories, Quantiﬁed Equilibrium Logic (QEL) [40]. As a result of this characterisation, the concept of stable model is
now deﬁned for any theory of predicate calculus with equality. In fact, stable models can be alternatively described by a
second-order logic operator [41] similar to Circumscription.
In this section we proceed to introduce the main deﬁnitions of QEL. For a better understanding, it is crucial to bear in
mind its intuitive connection to logic programming. In what follows, when talking about logic programs, we adopt a logical
syntax notation, replacing the usual ‘←’, ‘,’ and ‘not ’ operators respectively by implication, conjunction and negation. In this
way, for instance, a typical logic program rule like:
p(X) ← r(X, Y ),not q(Y )
would just be written as the formula R(x, y) ∧ ¬Q (x) → P (x) where all variables are implicitly universally quantiﬁed. This
interpretation is extensible to Equilibrium Logic, where operator ‘¬’ can be informally understood as default negation.
Let L= 〈C, F , P 〉 be a ﬁrst-order language where C is a set of constants, F a set of functions and P a set of predicates.
First-order formulae for L are built up in the usual way, with the same syntax of classical predicate calculus. As in In-
tuitionistic Calculus, the formula ¬ϕ will actually stand for ϕ → ⊥. We write Atoms(C, P ) to stand for the set of atomic
sentences built with predicates in P and constants in C . Similarly, Terms(C, F ) denote the set of ground terms built from
functions in F and constants in C . From now on, a formula with free variables is implicitly assumed to be preceded by their
universal quantiﬁcations.
The deﬁnition of Equilibrium Logic has two steps: we start ﬁrst from a (monotonic) intermediate logic and then deﬁne a
model selection criterion on this logic.
We recall the deﬁnition introduced in [18] of the logic of quantiﬁed here-and-there with static domain, decidable equality
and Herbrand structures, referring to it as the logic of here and there (HT) for short.
The HT logic is an intermediate logic. It can be deﬁned in terms of the Intuitionistic Calculus plus axioms:
α ∨ (¬β ∨ (α → β))
∀x ¬¬α(x) → ∃x (α(x) → ∀x α(x))
¬¬∃x α(x) → ∃x ¬¬α(x)
∀x∀y (x = y ∨ x = y) (DE)
where the abbreviation x = y stands for ¬(x = y). In particular, (DE) is the axiom for decidable equality and states that the
equality predicate behaves in a “classical” way, satisfying the law of the excluded middle.
The corresponding semantics for HT is described as follows.
Deﬁnition 1 (HT-interpretation). An HT interpretation for a language L= 〈C, F , P 〉 is a tuple 〈(D, σ ), H, T 〉 where:
1. D is a non-empty set of constant names identifying each element in the interpretation universe. For simplicity, we take
the same name for the constant and the universe element.
2. σ :Terms(D ∪ C, F ) → D assigns a constant in D to any term built with functions in F and constants in the extended
set of constants C ∪ D . It must satisfy: σ(d) = d for all d ∈ D .
3. H and T are sets of ground atomic sentences such that H ⊆ T ⊆ Atoms(D, P ).
Satisfaction of formulae is recursively deﬁned as follows. Given an interpretation M = 〈(D, σ ), H, T 〉, the following
statements are true:
• M | p(t1, . . . , tn) if p(σ (t1), . . . , σ (tn)) ∈ H .
• M | t1 = t2 if σ(t1) = σ(t2).
• M | ⊥.
• M | α ∧ β ifM | α andM | β . Disjunction ∨ is analogous.
• M | α → β if both:
(i) M | α orM | β and
(ii) 〈(D, σ ), T 〉 | α → β in classical logic.
• M | ∀x α(x) if for each d ∈ D ,M | α(d) and 〈(D, σ ), T 〉 | α(d).
• M | ∃x α(x) if for some d ∈ D ,M | α(d).
We say thatM is a model of a theory Γ ifM satisﬁes all the formulae in Γ .
An interpretation like 〈(D, σ ), T , T 〉 is said to be total and, moreover, may be seen as a classical interpretation 〈(D, σ ), T 〉.
In fact, it is easy to check that:
Proposition 1. 〈(D, σ ), T , T 〉 | Γ iff 〈(D, σ ), T 〉 | Γ in classical logic.
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ing relation among interpretations.
Deﬁnition 2. We say that an interpretationM= 〈(D, σ ), H, T 〉 is smaller than an interpretationM′ = 〈(D, σ ), H ′, T 〉, writ-
tenMM′ , when H ⊆ H ′ .
That is, to be comparable,M andM′ must only differ in their H component, so thatMM′ iff H ⊆ H ′ . As usual, we
writeM<M′ whenMM′ andM =M′ (that is H ⊂ H ′).
The next deﬁnition introduces the idea of minimal models for the HT logic.
Deﬁnition 3 (Equilibrium model). A total model M of a theory Γ is an equilibrium model if there is no smaller model
M′ <M of Γ .
Note that an equilibrium model is total, i.e., it has the form M= 〈(D, σ ), T , T 〉 and can be seen as a classical interpre-
tationM= 〈(D, σ ), T 〉. We name Quantiﬁed Equilibrium Logic (QEL) the logic induced by equilibrium models.
A Herbrand HT-interpretation 〈(D, id), H, T 〉 is such that D = Terms(C, F ) and σ = id, where id is the identity relation. In
the rest of the paper, we implicitly assume that we handle Herbrand HT models and Herbrand equilibrium models.
As usual, a literal is an atom p(t) or its negation ¬p(t). A logic program is a conjunction of implications α → β where α
(the body) is a conjunction of literals, β (the head) is a disjunction of literals, and all variables are universally quantiﬁed.
Proposition 2. (From [18].)M= 〈(D, σ ), T , T 〉 is a Herbrand equilibrium model of a logic program Π iff T is a stable model of the
(possibly inﬁnite) ground program grD(Π) obtained by replacing all variables by all terms in D in all possible ways.
Although QEL is deﬁned for any arbitrary ﬁrst-order theory, we will use in most cases a fragment of QEL that ﬁts into the
syntactic class of logic program rules. Furthermore, the rest of the formulae we use that do not belong to this class can be
translated into LP, although their direct QEL representation is much more compact or readable and requires fewer auxiliary
predicates. When specifying these translations we will say that two theories Γ1, Γ2 are strongly equivalent with respect to
a signature L, written Γ1 ≡Ls Γ2 iff for any theory Γ in that signature, the sets of equilibrium models of Γ1 ∪Γ and Γ2 ∪Γ ,
when restricted to signature L, coincide. The idea of strong equivalence is that it guarantees replacing Γ1 by Γ2 and vice
versa, regardless of the context Γ . In [18] it was shown that checking regular equivalence in the logic of Quantiﬁed Here
and There is a necessary and suﬃcient condition for Γ1 ≡Ls Γ2, provided that Γ1 and Γ2 also belong to the signature L.
Proposition 3. ϕ → ψ ∧ γ is HT-equivalent to (ϕ → ψ) ∧ (ϕ → γ ).
This proposition states that we can “compress” two program rules like ϕ → ψ and ϕ → γ into a formula ϕ → ψ ∧ γ
with a conjunction in the consequent.
Proposition 4. ¬ϕ is the formula ϕ → ⊥ by deﬁnition.
In fact, this is the deﬁnition of ¬ as a derived operator. It asserts that a negated formula ¬ϕ can be understood or
replaced by a constraint with ϕ in its body.
Proposition 5. ϕ → x= y is HT-equivalent to ϕ ∧ x = y → ⊥.
This proposition is saying that a rule with an equality in the head can be understood as a constraint (a rule with ⊥
head) where the negation of x = y has been moved to the antecedent.
Proposition 6. Let Γ1 be a theory consisting of the single formula
α(x) ∧ ¬∃y β(x,y) → γ (x) (1)
for language L, being x a tuple with all the variables that occur free in the antecedent or in the consequent. Then Γ1 ≡Ls Γ2 where Γ2
is the pair of formulae:
α(x) ∧ ¬aux(x) → γ (x), (2)
α(x) ∧ β(x,y) → aux(x) (3)
and aux(x) is a fresh auxiliary predicate not included in L.
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body by introducing a new auxiliary predicate. For example, the formula:
Person(x) ∧ ¬(∃y)(Person(y) ∧ Parent(x, y)) → Orphan(x)
is strongly equivalent to:
Person(x) ∧ ¬aux(x) → Orphan(x)
Person(x) ∧ Person(y) ∧ Parent(x, y) → aux(x)
where aux(x) is taking the intuitive meaning “x has some parent.”
The next section develops Situation Calculus in Quantiﬁed Equilibrium Logic.
4. Situation Calculus theories in equilibrium logic
We introduce next a version of the Situation Calculus which essentially maintains its standard syntax [17,6], but replaces
Predicate Calculus by Quantiﬁed Equilibrium Logic as the underlying logical framework. Our formalisation will be multi-
sorted. We deﬁne a ﬁnite set of action names Action plus a ﬁnite set of ﬂuent names Fluent. A situation is deﬁned in
the usual way, that is, it can be the constant S0 (the initial situation) or a term like do(a, s) where a is an action and s a
situation in its turn. We will use variables a,a′ for the sort Action, s, s′ for the sort Situation and f , f ′ for Fluent.
Notice that, as we deal with Herbrand models, axioms for unique names assumption are not needed. However, we do
include Domain Closure axioms for all sorted variables. For instance, for any variable a ranging on sort Action we have:
(∃x1)
[
a = A1(x1)
]∨ · · · ∨ (∃xn)[a = An(xn)], (DC)
where the Ai are all the action names included in Action and each xi is a tuple of variables whose cardinality is the arity
of Ai . Analogous axioms are included for the Fluent sort.
All ﬂuents will be functional, that is, each f (x) has a unique value v among a range of possible values we denote
range( f ). The predicate Holds( f (x), v, s) represents that the ﬂuent f (x) is assigned a value v ∈ range( f ) at a situation s.
In order to keep an homogeneous notation, a Boolean ﬂuent f will also be considered as functional with range( f ) =
Boolean= {True, False}. As we will see later, this will be especially convenient7 for specifying the inertia default.
Since the ﬂuent stands for a function, it will have a unique value:
Holds
(
f (x), v, s
)∧ Holds( f (x), v ′, s) → v = v ′. (UV)
Although in Situation Calculus we can always build formulae with any situation term, we will be usually interested
in describing some situations that are unfeasible, as some of their occurring actions cannot be executed. This is typically
accomplished by a predicate Poss(a, s) to point out when an action a is possible in a situation s. This predicate is used in
so-called unfeasibility axioms, intuitively describing conditions under which Poss(a, s) is false, and in effect axioms, where
Poss(a, s) is used in the antecedent of an implication, acting as one more condition for the causal rule to be applied. Note
that this predicate should be true by default, that is, we only want to specify when an action cannot be executed, rather
than explicitly stating all the cases in which the action can be performed. However, as in Equilibrium Logic all predicates
are false by default, we use here the predicate Imposs(a, s) stating the exact opposite, that is, performing the action a is
impossible at the situation s.
A ﬂuent may have a designated default value default( f ) = d, d ∈ range( f ). In order to establish the effect of this default
value, we further divide the sort Fluent into two disjoint subsets: Inert (inertial ﬂuents) and NonInert (non-inertial
ﬂuents or events). For any non-inertial ﬂuent, f ∈ NonInert with default( f ) = d, we include the axiom:
¬(∃v)[v = d ∧ Holds( f (x), v, s)] → Holds( f (x),d, s) (DV)
that intuitively captures the meaning of its default value for any situation s. In the case of inertial ﬂuents, however, the
default ﬂuent value will be its value in a previous situation (this is the inertia assumption):
¬Imposs(a, s) ∧ Holds( f (x), v, s)∧ ¬Released( f (x), s)
∧ ¬(∃w)[w = v ∧ Holds( f (x),w,do(a, s))] → Holds( f (x), v,do(a, s)). (INE)
In other words, when an action execution is possible, ¬Imposs(a, s), if a ﬂuent f (x) had value v in the previous situation
s and there is no evidence that the ﬂuent has a different value w in the next situation do(a, s) then the ﬂuent value v
remains unchanged in do(a, s). The additional condition ¬Released( f (x), s) is included so that, when convenient, we can
6 See the recent works [42] and [43] for a detailed description on this technique of removing existential quantiﬁers from the rule bodies.
7 Most logic programming formalisations of inertia for boolean ﬂuents make use of a second negation called strong or explicit. In this sense, an atom
like Holds( f (x), False, s) can be seen as the strong negation of f (x) at situation s. The advantage of our representation is that the inertia axiom is the same
for Boolean and non-Boolean ﬂuents.
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“release” a given inertial ﬂuent f (x) from following the inertia default at a particular situation s. Predicate Released will be
particularly useful for forcing a ﬂuent f (x) to become undeﬁned (that is, it has no associated value), something we will
represent with the negation of the following derived predicate:
Deﬁned
(
f (x), s
) ↔ (∃v)Holds( f (x), v, s). (4)
As we can see, Axiom (INE) does not establish any default assumption for the ﬂuent value at the initial situation S0. The
ﬂuent default value, when provided, is used for that case. In other words, when f is inertial and has some default( f ) = d
we include the following version of (DV):
¬(∃v)[v = d ∧ Holds( f (x), v, S0)] → Holds( f (x),d, S0). (DV0)
For a compact description of a ﬂuent, we use the notation8 f : D → R = d where D is the ﬂuent domain, R the range
and ‘= d’ is an optional speciﬁcation of a default value default( f ) = d.
We write ESC (for Equilibrium Situation Calculus) to denote this multi-sorted version of QEL including the set of axioms
seen before in this section: (DC), (UV), (DV), (INE) and (DV0).
Since our spatial theory will deal with a relatively complex representation, it may be convenient to consider ﬁrst a clas-
sical actions’ scenario: the Yale Shooting Scenario [13], for a better understanding of notation and semantics. It is worth
pointing out that the solution of this scenario in ESC shows how the semantics of Equilibrium Logic, together with the Situ-
ation Calculus, solves the Frame Problem in a rigorous way. This solution is inherited by our formalisation of the Fisherman’s
Folly puzzle, developed below.
Example 1. Consider the classical Yale Shooting Scenario [13] where we have a gun that must be previously loaded in order
to shoot and kill a turkey. Initially the gun is not loaded and the turkey alive. We load the gun, wait one situation, and then
shoot.
The formalisation of Example 1 would include the sorts Action= {load,wait, shoot} and Inert= {loaded,alive}, with
both ﬂuents of range Boolean and no default value. The theory YALE would consist of ESC plus the formulae:
Holds(loaded,True, s) → Imposs(load, s), (5)
Holds(loaded, False, s) → Imposs(shoot, s), (6)
¬Imposs(load, s) ∧ s′ = do(load, s) → Holds(loaded,True, s′), (7)
¬Imposs(shoot, s) ∧ s′ = do(shoot, s) → Holds(alive, False, s′)∧ Holds(loaded, False, s′), (8)
Holds(loaded, False, S0) ∧ Holds(alive,True, S0). (9)
Proposition 7. Theory YALE has a unique equilibriummodel whose atoms for Holds corresponds to the state transition system in Fig. 5.
Proof. See Appendix B. 
As a result, the following is a QEL consequence of YALE:
Holds
(
alive, False,do
(
shoot,do
(
wait,do(load, S0)
)))
(it suﬃces to check it in Fig. 5).
Having ESC at our disposal, next section formalises the Fisherman’s Folly puzzle in Equilibrium Situation Calculus.
8 The current formalisation for functional ﬂuents with default values has been adapted from [44].
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In [16] the puzzle entities were classiﬁed into three different sorts: regular objects, holes (actually, single-holed objects)
and long objects that will be respectively named as Regular, Hole and Long. In the Fisherman’s Folly domain, these sorts
respectively consist of:
Regular= {Disk1,Disk2,Base},
Hole= {Ring, Sphere1, Sphere2,PostH}, and
Long= {Str,Post}. (10)
Notice that, for notational simplicity, we identify a hole, like the ring hole, with its host object, like Ring. The whole
set of physical objects is simply denoted as Object def= Regular ∪ Hole ∪ Long. We will also handle additional derived
sorts. The sort of sets of long objects Longset
def= 2Long will be used to specify when a given object can pass through a
hole currently crossed by several long objects. To understand the need for this sort, note for instance that the Sphere1 can
pass through the ring, provided that the latter is not being currently crossed by the Post. We assume we have available the
set predicates ‘∈’ and ‘⊆’ with their standard meaning (note that Longset is ﬁnite and the whole extension of these two
predicates can be provided explicitly without requiring further axiomatisation). Similarly, we will use the union operator ∪
which can be ﬁxed to its usual meaning in a similar way.
We will deﬁne the two sides of a hole (we will call them faces) or the two tips of a long object as follows:
Face
def= {face(h,+), face(h,−) ∣∣ h ∈ Hole};
Tip def= {tip(x,+), tip(x,−) ∣∣ x ∈ Long},
where tip and face are two new constructors or function symbols.9 For the sake of compactness, we will use the abbrevia-
tions h+,h−, x+ and x− respectively standing for face(h,+), face(h,−), tip(x,+) and tip(x,−). In this way, for instance, the
string has the two tips Str+ and Str− whereas the Ring has two faces denoted as Ring+ and Ring− . The predicate Opposite
will be used to assert that two different hole faces correspond to the same hole:
Opposite
(
h+,h−
)∧ Opposite(h−,h+). (11)
Finally, we deﬁne a pair of additional (ﬁnite) derived sorts to deal with links among objects. The sort Node def= Tip ∪
Hole∪Regular captures all the possible elements that can form a node of a link. The difference with respect to Object
is that, for linking a long object x, we must use one of its tips x+ or x− as the link node. We also deﬁne Nodeset def= 2Node
that will be used to allow moving “bundles” of linked objects, and use ∈,⊆,∪ as we did for the sort Longset.
5.1. Spatial predicates and ﬂuents
We begin deﬁning an inertial ﬂuent linked ∈ Inert:
linked : Node× Node→ Boolean= False
whose meaning is self-explanatory. In our scenario, linked will always relate a tip to a regular or a holed object, and this
information will not vary along time. We prefer to maintain this as a ﬂuent, and not as a static predicate, to allow a future
inclusion of possible actions that change the degree of connectivity between objects.
Formulae that describe a particular Fisherman’s Folly puzzle conﬁguration will be labelled as (FFn). For instance, the
initial facts for linked in the puzzle would be:
Holds
(
linked
(
Str−,Disk1
)
,True, S0
) ∧ Holds(linked(Str+,Disk2),True, S0)
∧ Holds(linked(Post+,PostH),True, S0)
∧ Holds(linked(Post−,Base),True, S0). (FF1)
As we can see in its declaration, linked will be False by default. If we do not provide further information for this predicate
apart from (INE), axiom (DV) allows deriving that all the rest will be false. The following are some axioms for the ﬂuent
linked:
9 Remember we handle Herbrand models.
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(
linked(x, y),True, s
) → Holds(linked(y, x),True, s), (12)
Holds
(
linked(x, y),True, s
)∧ Holds(linked(y, z),True, s) → Holds(linked(x, z),True, s), (13)
Holds
(
linked
(
x+, x−
)
, False, s
)
. (14)
They respectively assert that the relation linked is commutative, transitive, and that the two tips of a long object are never
linked.10
In principle, information about what can or cannot pass through a hole will not vary along time. For this reason, we just
consider a static predicate CannotPass(x,h, y) to represent that the object x cannot pass through the hole h when the latter
is currently crossed by the set of long objects y. In the Fisherman’s Folly example we include the following facts:
CannotPass(disk, sphere,∅) ∧ CannotPass(disk,Ring,∅)
∧ CannotPass(Base,Ring,∅) ∧ CannotPass(Base,PostH,∅)
∧ CannotPass(Base, sphere,∅)
∧ CannotPass(Post, sphere,∅) ∧ CannotPass(Post,PostH,∅)
∧ CannotPass(sphere,PostH,∅) ∧ CannotPass(sphere, sphere′,∅)
∧ CannotPass(sphere,Ring, {Post})
∧ CannotPass(PostH, sphere,∅)
∧ CannotPass(Ring, sphere,∅) (FF2)
with disk varying on {Disk1,Disk2} and sphere, sphere′ on {Sphere1, Sphere2}. Note, for instance, that under any circumstance,
any string can be passed through any hole. Note also that the spheres can pass through the Ring, unless the Ring is crossed
by the Post. In order to guarantee this latter constraint, the following two axioms are also included:
CannotPass(h,h, y); (15)
CannotPass(x,h, y) ∧ y ⊆ z → CannotPass(x,h, z), (16)
respectively stating that a single holed object h cannot pass through itself, and that once x cannot pass through h when
crossed by y, the same will hold for any superset of y. We also assert that if a long object x cannot pass through a hole,
then none of its tips can do so by default:
CannotPass(x,h, y) ∧ ¬CanPass(xv ,h, y) → CannotPass(xv ,h, z), (17)
where CanPass is an auxiliary predicate used to assert exceptions to this rule.
It is worth pointing out that, as predicates are false by default and CannotPass is a “negative” predicate, we are assuming
that objects can pass through holes as a default. Apparently, this does not seem to be well chosen for the Fisherman’s Folly
scenario, where there actually exist more cases in which objects cannot pass through holes than those that can – in other
words, (FF2) would be smaller for a CanPass predicate. However, in a more complex scenario, it may be the case that we
do not have this information in a complete way. If so, the advantage of our representation is that an hypothetical planner
could go ﬁnding “optimistic” plans that, when tried on the physical object, could perhaps be unfeasible at some point of
their execution, but could help us to ﬁnd out a new fact for CannotPass(x,h, y) we had not realised before. In this way, we
could go reﬁning our information for CannotPass until some obtained plan actually solves the physical problem.
5.2. Crossings and segments
When representing a long object, the relevant information we will be interested in is the set of hole crossings. It is impor-
tant to notice that the same long object can cross the same hole several times and in different directions (this is especially
common when the long object is ﬂexible, like a string). If we understand long objects and holes as three-dimensional
regions, a crossing is the overlapping region between a hole and a long object. We can deﬁne a segment as a maximal
continuous portion of a long object not overlapping with any hole. An important assumption about long objects will be
made:
For any long object x, there cannot be a segment of x connecting more than two hole crossings.
10 In this paper we disregard handling circular long objects or, similarly, linking the negative and positive tips of a same long object. This possibility is
left for future study.
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concept of segment. Thus, when writing formulae, we will require a way to refer to a given segment. The representation of
segments of a long object x will be done using segment labels. A segment label i is a term that must uniquely identify each
segment in a long object x. In the textual or graphical explanations, we will represent a segment as x : i where x is a long
object and i a label.
Intuitively, a good candidate sort for segment labels could be the natural numbers 0,1,2, . . . , or equivalently their Peano-
like representation 0, s(0), s(s(0)), . . . so that we use their ordering to follow the sequence of crossings in the long object
from tip x− to tip x+ . In this way, for instance, the string would have the four initial segments Str : 0 (from Disk1 to Sphere1),
Str : 1 (from Sphere1 to PostH), Str : 2 (from PostH to Sphere2) and Str : 3 (from Sphere2 to Disk2). An important problem,
however, is that the set of segments will vary along time depending on the actions performed. When segments disappear
this is not a real problem, as this just means that we will “stop using” a label in the relevant ﬂuents that represent the
long object state. Unfortunately, we also need to create new segments, which sometimes must be included between two
existing segments. In this way, we should be able to partition a segment into new fragments as many times as needed.
One possibility could be using rational numbers to this aim.11 However, in order to avoid their axiomatisation, we adopt a
simpler choice. We will use four new Herbrand functions or label constructors pred(i), mid1(i, j), mid2(i, j) and succ(i), so
that:
• x : pred(i) denotes a predecessor segment to x : i;
• x : succ(i) denotes a successor segment to x : i and
• x : mid1(i, j) and x : mid2(i, j) denote a pair of segments that are positioned in this same ordering, in the middle of x : i
and x : j.
We assume that there exists a way to assign a different label to each object segment occurring in the initial situation
S0. Let us call InitLabel this ﬁnite set of initial labels. The sort Label is recursively deﬁned as: l ∈ Label iff l ∈
InitLabel or l has any of the forms pred(i), succ(i), mid1(i, j) or mid2(i, j) with i, j ∈ Label.
As said before, we will represent the list of segments and crossings following the chain from the negative tip x− to the
positive one x+ . To this aim we can imagine a linear graph where each node is a segment and each arc is labelled with
the crossing that connects both segments, represented by the corresponding outgoing hole face. Following this notation, the
initial situation of the string Str would correspond to the graph:
Str : 0 Sphere1
+
−→ Str : 1 PostH+−→ Str : 2 Sphere2
+
−→ Str : 3.
The representation of this graph will be done with a pair of inertial ﬂuents:
next : Long× Label→ Label∪ {End}
towards : Long× Label→ Face
so that, for instance, a pair of facts like
Holds
(
next(Str,0),1, s
)∧ Holds(towards(Str,0), Sphere1+, s)
represent the labelled graph edge Str : 0 Sphere1
+
−→ Str : 1. For convenience, the last segment in the list will further point to a
special constant End – in our example, Holds(next(Str,3),End, S0).
It must be noticed that not any possible pair x : i will form a real object segment in any situation. For instance, in the goal
situation, the long object Post does not cross any hole and so, it has a unique segment, labelled in this case as Post : 0. Thus,
for instance, there are no segments Post : 1 or Post : 2 in that situation, although 1 and 2 are possible labels. The “existence”
of a segment x : i at a given situation s is captured by the fact that no atom Holds(next(x, i), z, s) or Holds(towards(x, i), y, s)
is true at that situation, i.e., the segment is not referenced as argument of any true atom.
The initial situation in the puzzle can be represented now by the formula:
Holds
(
next(Str,0),1, S0
) ∧ Holds(towards(Str,0), Sphere1+, S0)
∧ Holds(next(Str,1),2, S0)∧ Holds(towards(Str,1),PostH+, S0)
∧ Holds(next(Str,2),3, S0)∧ Holds(towards(Str,2), Sphere2+, S0)
∧ Holds(next(Str,3),End, S0)
∧ Holds(next(Post,0),1, S0)∧ Holds(towards(Post,0),Ring+, S0)
∧ Holds(next(Post,1),End, S0) (FF3)
11 Another possibility we have not explored is the use of existential quantiﬁers, but this would surely mean a more diﬃcult reading and longer formulae
to guarantee that segment labels are pairwise different.
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where, as we can see in the ﬁfth line of the previous statement, the post has also a crossing (towards Ring+) and so it has
been divided into two segments, Post : 0 and Post : 1. We include the following axiom, to check that in S0 no segment x : k
is preceded by two different crossings:
Holds
(
next(x, i),k, S0
)∧ Holds(next(x, j),k, S0) → i = j. (18)
At this point we would like to recall the schematic representation introduced in Section 2 (Fig. 3), reproduced in Fig. 6
for convenience. Note the representation of segments: x : i.
An additional non-inertial ﬂuent (from below) will be useful for specifying action preconditions in a more readable12
way.
from :Long× Label→ Face.
Its meaning is ﬁxed by the axiom:
Holds
(
next(x, j), i, s
)∧ Holds(towards(x, j), p, s) → Holds(from(x, i), p, s) (19)
that is, towards and from respectively indicate the next and the previous hole crossing of a given segment x : i.
5.3. Actions
From a physical point of view, the solution to the Fisherman’s Folly puzzle can be exclusively described in terms of
actions for passing objects through holes in a given direction. In principle, this would lead us to consider some action like
pass(x, p) meaning that we pass object x through some hole towards its face p, such as for instance, pass(Ring,PostH+).
Although in principle x could be of any type Regular ∪ Long ∪ Hole, in practice some objects are not relevant to be
passed through a hole, w.r.t. the puzzle’s states. For example, assume we have a disconnected disk and we decide to pass
it through the post hole: it is not diﬃcult to see that this action has no effect on our state representation at all. Generally
speaking, passing a regular object x through a hole is only really relevant when x is linked to some tip of a long object.
For this reason, we disregard the case x ∈ Regular in favour of passing long object tips instead, x ∈ Tip. Note that, by
passing tips, we can also disregard pass(x, p) for a whole long object x ∈ Long, as it can be replaced by a sequence of
pass(x+, p),pass(x−, p) or pass(x−, p),pass(x+, p). The only remaining possibility is pass(x, p) for some x ∈ Hole, that is,
some single holed object. In fact, the most diﬃcult part of the formalisation has to do with the case in which x is currently
crossed by one or more segments of one or more long objects.
Apart from individually passing tips and holed objects, we must also bear in mind one more feature that is present in
the problem: linked objects. In our puzzle, we have four pairs of linked elements: three of them are linking tips to regular
objects, but one is linking a tip to a holed object. It is not diﬃcult to imagine other scenarios (see, for instance, the Tricky
Dick puzzle discussed in Appendix C) where we may also link two tips of (different) long objects or two linked holed
objects. When elements are linked one each other, passing them through a hole implies passing each of their individual
components. We will deﬁne the concept of object bundle as a (maximal) set of linked objects. The non-inertial ﬂuent:
bundle :Nodeset→ Boolean= True,
will be used to reﬂect that a given set of objects B forms a bundle at some situation. This ﬂuent is True by default because
it is easier to specify when an arbitrary set of objects b does not form a bundle. Its meaning is captured by the following
axioms:
12 In fact, references to this additional ﬂuent in action preconditions could be replaced by a suitable use of quantiﬁers.
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x ∈ b ∧ y ∈ b ∧Holds(linked(x, y), False, s) → Holds(bundle(b), False, s), (20)
x ∈ b ∧ ¬(y ∈ b) ∧ Holds(linked(x, y),True, s) → Holds(bundle(b), False, s), (21)
Holds
(
bundle(∅), False, s). (22)
Axiom (20) asserts that the set b does not form a bundle when it contains two unlinked objects x and y. Axiom (20)
captures the bundle maximality: a bundle b cannot contain an object x linked to an external element y not in b. Finally,
(22) asserts that the empty set cannot be a bundle.
Example 2. Axioms for bundle (20)–(22) and linked (12)–(14) plus the initial state of linked in the Fisherman’s Folly puzzle
(FF1) and the default values for linked and bundle allow deriving the facts:
Holds
(
bundle
({
Str−,Disk1
})
,True, S0
) ∧ Holds(bundle({Str+,Disk2}),True, S0)
∧ Holds(bundle({Post−,Base}),True, S0)
∧ Holds(bundle({Post+,PostH}),True, S0)
and no other bundle is formed at situation S0.
To sum up, our main action will have the form pass(b, p) meaning that we pass the bundle b towards the hole face p.
We will ﬁrst describe the unfeasibility axioms, that is, conditions for which it is impossible to perform action pass(b, p) at a
given situation. To this aim, we deﬁne an auxiliary non-inertial ﬂuent:
crossedBy : Hole× Longset→ Boolean= False,
with axioms
Holds
(
towards(x, i),hv , s
) → Holds(crossedBy(h, {x}),True, s), (23)
Holds
(
crossedBy(h,a),True, s
)∧ Holds(crossedBy(h,b),True, s) → Holds(crossedBy(h,a ∪ b),True, s). (24)
In other words, crossedBy points out all the long object sets that are crossing a given hole h at situation s. The unfeasibility
conditions are then speciﬁed as follows:
Holds
(
bundle(b), False, s
) → Imposs(pass(b, p), s), (25)
x ∈ b ∧Holds(crossedBy(h,a),True, s)∧ CannotPass(x,h,a) → Imposs(pass(b,hv), s). (26)
Axiom (25) asserts that we cannot pass a set b that does not form a bundle. Axiom (26) says that a bundle b cannot pass
through a hole h if b contains some node13 x that cannot currently pass through h.
Let us proceed now with the effect axioms, that is, the causal rules describing effects of an action. To this aim, the effects
and constraints for passing a tip or a holed object inside a bundle are described separately. For instance, for passing a
positive tip x+ to some face p, we get:
¬Imposs(pass(b, p), s)∧ x+ ∈ b ∧ s′ = do(pass(b, p), s)∧ Opposite(p, p′)
∧ Holds(next(x, i),End, s)∧ ¬Holds(from(x, i), p′, s)
→ Holds(next(x, i), succ(i), s′)∧ Holds(towards(x, i), p, s′)
∧ Holds(next(x, succ(i)),End, s)∧ Released(towards(x, i), s). (PR)
13 To be precise, we could modify CannotPass to reﬂect when a set of objects cannot pass altogether through a hole currently crossed by another set of
objects, but this is not really needed for the current puzzles and is disregarded in this paper.
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Axiom name (PR) stands for Positive tip to “Right”. This axiom asserts that if x : i is the last segment and there is no
preceding crossing through the same hole in the opposite direction p′ , then we add a new crossing from x : i passing
through p to a new (last) segment x : succ(i). The analogous movement for a positive tip (Positive tip to Left) would be
covered by:
¬Imposs(pass(b, p), s)∧ x+ ∈ b ∧ s′ = do(pass(b, p), s)∧ Opposite(p, p′)∧ Holds(next(x, i0), i1, s)
∧ Holds(towards(x, i0), p′, s)∧ Holds(next(x, i1),End, s)
→ Holds(next(x, i0),End, s′)∧ Released(towards(x, i0), s)
∧ Released(next(x, i1), s) (PL)
which states that when we execute pass(x+, p) but the last crossing of x was in the opposite direction p′ , we must remove
this crossing and the last segment. Fig. 7 schematically shows the effects of movements (PR), (PL).
Analogous axioms are included for passing the tip x− . Passing Negative tip to Left is stated as follows:
¬Imposs(pass(b, p), s)∧ x− ∈ b ∧ s′ = do(pass(b, p), s)∧ Opposite(p, p′)
∧ ¬Deﬁned(from(x, i), s) ∧ Deﬁned(next(x, i), s)∧ ¬Holds(from(x, i), p, s)
→ Holds(next(x,pred(i)), i, s′)∧ Holds(towards(x,pred(i)), p′, s′), (NL)
that is, if i is the ﬁrst segment (there are no previous crossings) and it is not followed by a crossing p then we add a new
(ﬁrst) segment pred(i) passing through p′ towards i. Note that we require Deﬁned(next(x, i), s) so that x : i is an existing
segment, i.e., it is followed by a crossing or by End (in this case, it would be the sole object segment). Finally, the action for
passing the Negative tip of a long object to the Right of a hole is represented as follows:
¬Imposs(pass(b, p), s)∧ x− ∈ b ∧ s′ = do(pass(b, p), s)∧ Opposite(p, p′)∧ Holds(next(x, i0), i1, s)
∧ Holds(towards(x, i0), p, s)∧ ¬Deﬁned(from(x, i0), s)
→ Released(next(x, i0), s)∧ Released(towards(x, i0), s) (NR)
which means that, if x : i0 is the initial segment (it has no previous crossing) and it points to x : i1 through face p, then this
crossing is removed, so x : i1 implicitly becomes the ﬁrst segment. Fig. 8 graphically represents the effects of (NL), (NR) –
notice that the ﬁgure is almost symmetrical to Fig. 7.
We move now to consider the effects of passing a holed object h through another hole towards the outgoing face p of
the latter. For instance, pass(b,Ring−) with PostH ∈ b would pass the post hole towards the bottom side of the ring (in other
words, slide the ring upwards along the post hole). The execution of this action will affect all crossings of any long object x
towards any face hv of h. Note that the same long object may cross the same hole several times and in different directions.
¬Imposs(pass(b, p), s)∧ h ∈ b ∧ Opposite(p, p′)∧ s′
= do(pass(b, p), s)∧ ¬Holds(from(x, i0), p′, s)∧ Holds(next(x, i0), i1, s)
∧ Holds(towards(x, i0),hv , s)∧ ¬Holds(towards(x, i1), p, s)
→ Holds(next(x, i0),mid1(i0, i1), s′)∧ Holds(towards(x, i0), p, s′)∧ Holds(next(x,mid1(i0, i1)),mid2(i0, i1), s′)
∧ Holds(towards(x,mid1(i0, i1)),hv , s′)
∧ Holds(next(x,mid2(i0, i1)), i1, s′)∧ Holds(towards(x,mid2(i0, i1)), p′, s′). (1R)
This ﬁrst movement is applicable when segment x : i0 crosses h towards x : i1 but the former is not preceded by a
crossing through p′ (the opposite of p) and the latter is not followed by a crossing through p. The effect of pass(b, p) in
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this part of the list is the insertion of two new crossings, one through p before h and one after h through p′ . This also
implies the creation of two new segments labelled with mid1(i0, i1) and mid2(i0, i1). The opposite movement is captured
by the axiom:
¬Imposs(pass(b, p), s)∧ h ∈ b ∧ Opposite(p, p′)
∧ s′ = do(pass(b, p), s)∧ Holds(next(x, i0), i1, s)∧ Holds(towards(x, i0), p′, s)
∧ Holds(next(x, i1), i2, s)∧ Holds(towards(x, i1),hv , s)
∧ Holds(next(x, i2), i3, s)∧ Holds(towards(x, i2), p, s)
→ Holds(next(x, i0), i3, s′)∧Holds(towards(x, i0),hv , s′)
∧ Released(next(x, i1), s)∧ Released(towards(x, i1), s)
∧ Released(next(x, i2), s)∧ Released(towards(x, i2), s). (1L)
When we have a sequence of crossings p′ , hv , p (with p′ opposite face of p), action pass(h, p) implies removing crossings
p′ and p from the list. Movements (1R), (1L) are schematically represented in Fig. 9.
The remaining movements do not create or destroy segments, but just swap crossings:
¬Imposs(pass(b, p), s)∧ h ∈ b ∧ Opposite(p, p′)
∧ s′ = do(pass(b, p), s)∧ ¬Holds(from(x, i0), p′, s)∧Holds(next(x, i0), i1, s)
∧ Holds(towards(x, i0),hv , s)∧ Holds(towards(x, i1), p, s)
→ Holds(towards(x, i0), p, s′)∧ Holds(towards(x, i1),hv , s′), (2R)
¬Imposs(pass(b, p), s)∧ h ∈ b ∧ Opposite(p, p′)
∧ s′ = do(pass(b, p), s)∧ Holds(next(x, i0), i1, s)∧ Holds(towards(x, i0), p′, s)
∧ Holds(next(x, i1), i2, s)∧ Holds(towards(x, i1),hv , s)∧ ¬Holds(next(x, i2), p, s)
→ Holds(towards(x, i0),hv , s′)∧ Holds(towards(x, i1), p′, s′). (2L)
The graphical representation of these movements is shown in Fig. 10.
The goal can be speciﬁed as a ground situation s that satisﬁes the formula
GOAL(s)
def= ¬(∃x, i, v)[Holds(towards(x, i),Ringv , s)]
which is entailed from our scenario description. GOAL(s) asserts that the Ring hole is not referenced in any crossing and so,
is completely free.
We deﬁne the Holes and Strings Theory, HST, as the set of formulae ESC∪{(11)–(26), (PR), (PL), (NR), (NL), (1L), (1R), (2L),
(2R)}. An HST scenario consists of axioms in HST plus the deﬁnition of sorts Regular, Hole, Long and domain dependent
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axioms containing a conjunction of ground atoms for predicate CannotPass and initial values of linked, next and towards. In
particular, we deﬁne the Fisherman’s Folly scenario, FOLLY, by adding to HST the sorts in (10) and the domain dependent
axioms (FF1), (FF2) and (FF3).
The following proposition shows that the method for labelling new segments works as expected.
Proposition 8. Let M be an Equilibrium model of an HST scenario and let L(s) = {i | M | Deﬁned(next(x, i), s)}, that is, the labels of
“existing” segments at situation s. Then, if the antecedent of (PR) holds in M, the composed label referred in its consequent succ(i) does
not belong to L(s). The same happens for (NL) with new label pred(i) and for (1R) with the new labels mid1(i0, i1) and mid2(i0, i1).
Proof sketch. This relies on the fact that we can establish a strict ordering relation among labels that coincides with their
sequence in the long object for the initial situation, while for composed labels satisﬁes: if pred(i) < i, i < mid1(i, j) <
mid2(i, j) < j and i < succ(i). 
An important observation is that, axioms in an HST scenario can be seen as logic program rules, as with the formali-
sation of the Yale Shooting scenario in Example 1. Furthermore, HST also preserves the same dependence ordering among
situations: a predecessor situation s never depends on a successor one do(a, s). So, a similar splitting technique can be used
to prove the following results.
Proposition 9. Let M be an equilibrium model of some HST scenario. Then, M satisﬁes (18) for any situation s:
Holds
(
next(x, i),k, s
) ∧ Holds(next(x, j),k, s) → i = j.
In other words, we never get into a situation where two different crossings point to the same long object segment x : k.
Proposition 10. Any HST scenario has at most a unique Equilibrium model.
Proof sketch. As with YALE, if we carefully look at all movements, it can be checked that they induce a deterministic state
transition system. 
In the case of FOLLY, the theory is consistent, and so has a unique equilibrium model capturing the whole transition
state system of the puzzle.
The next section discusses the correspondence of the above formalisation with respect to a model of the domain based
on list manipulation. We argue that this model guarantees the correctness of our rigorous account of the Fisherman’s Folly
puzzle.
6. The induced transition system: operations on lists of crossings
As we have seen the previous formalisation is not too far away from other typical uses of Situation Calculus, except that
classical Predicate Calculus has been replaced by First-Order Equilibrium Logic as the underlying logical formalism. The use
of the Situation Calculus allows us to express non-trivial properties of the system, while providing a high degree of ﬂexibility
and elaboration tolerance. In this way, our formalisation can cope with some simple modiﬁcations of the scenario like
adding new constraints, or deﬁning new actions. On the other hand, the use of Equilibrium Logic as the underlying logical
formalism allows us to inherit most of the typical constructs from action representations using Answer Set Programming [45]
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(INE), and we may naturally deal with indirect effects, like Axiom (19), or handle action disqualiﬁcations, as shown with
respect to the predicate Imposs.
Analogous to our investigation of the Yale Shooting Scenario in Fig. 5 (Section 4), we can also study the transition
system induced by our logical representation. This may help for a better understanding of the system behaviour, and can
also be used for an eﬃcient implementation of a planning algorithm. On the other hand, it must be taken into account that
a transition system is much less elaboration tolerant than the logical representation – for instance, it cannot adequately
represent default values, inertia or indirect effects, so that small elaborations of the domain may drastically affect the
transition system conﬁguration.
In order to describe the transition system states, we have a problem that did not manifest in the Yale Shooting scenario,
where all ﬂuents were Boolean – we have an inﬁnite set of states and, furthermore, their representation is hard due to the
possibility of arbitrarily creating new segments. To avoid using segments in the transition system representation, we adopt
the approach we followed in a previous work [16] (brieﬂy introduced in Section 2) where a puzzle state was represented
as an ordered list of crossings for each long object. Transitions were then speciﬁed as combinations of elementary trans-
formations on these lists, inducing a transition system for which a simple forward-driven planner was designed. We will
describe next the correspondence between the list-based solution of the puzzle and our present formalisation, proving the
correctness of the planner.
In this section we use Greek letters α,β,γ , . . . to denote lists and adopt the usual Prolog list notation. The expression
α · β represents the concatenation of lists α and β . Given an HST interpretation M and a situation s we will deﬁne its
corresponding state as a set of lists chain(x) for each long object x ∈ Long. The formal deﬁnition of chain(x) will be done in
terms of an auxiliary list cr(x, i), where i is one of the segment labels of x. This list cr collects all the crossings that follow
a given long object segment x : i (cf. the informal deﬁnitions presented in Section 2 above).
Deﬁnition 4 (Crossing list). Given a model M of an HST scenario, a segment x : i, and a ground situation s, we deﬁne the list
cr(x, i, s) recursively as follows:
cr(x, i, s)
def=
{ [p] · cr(x, j, s) if M | Holds(next(x, i), j, s) ∧ Holds(towards(x, i), p, s)
[ ] if M | Holds(next(x, i),End, s).
The list chain(x, s) just appends the left and right tip of x as ﬁrst and last element of the list obtained by cr(x, i, s), being
x : i the ﬁrst segment of x. This is formally speciﬁed by:
Deﬁnition 5 (Chain list). Given a model M of an HST scenario, a long object x, and a ground situation s, we deﬁne the list
chain(x, s) as:
chain(x, s)
def= [x−] · cr(x, i, s) · [x+]
where i is such that M | ¬Deﬁned(from(x, i), s) ∧ Deﬁned(next(x, i), s), that is, the ﬁrst segment label of x.
With these rules, it is easy to see that the state corresponding to the initial situation would be described by the pair of
lists:
chain(Str, S0) =
[
Str−, Sphere1+,PostH+, Sphere2+, Str+
]
,
chain(Post, S0) =
[
Post−,Ring+,Post+
]
.
Now, we will show that the value of chain(x,do(a, s)) after a transition can be directly computed from chain(s) using a
pair of simple list transformation operators, one for each action type: passing tips pass(t, p) and passing single-holed objects
pass(h, p).
Deﬁnition 6 (Operator opTt,p). Let x be a long object, t one of its tips t = xv , p a face and p′ its opposite face. The transfor-
mation on list α = chain(x) caused by the action pass(t, p), written opTt,p , is deﬁned as: opTt,p def=
β · [y, p, x+] if t = x+, α = β · [y, x+], y = p′, (27)
β · [x+] if t = x+, α = β · [p′, x+], (28)[
x−, p′, y
] · β if t = x−, α = [x−, y] · β, y = p, (29)[
x−
] · β if t = x−, α = [x−, p] · β, (30)
where α · β denotes the concatenation of lists α and β .
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introduced in Section 5.1. The remaining movements of the puzzle can be stated as shown in Deﬁnition 7 below.
Deﬁnition 7 (Operator opHh,p). Let h be a hole, p a face and p
′ the opposite face of p. Given a list of crossings α = chain(z)
for a long object z, the transformation on α caused by an action pass(h, p), written opHh,p(α), is recursively deﬁned as:
opHh,p(α)
def=
[x] if α = [x], (31)
[x | γ ] if α = [x, gv ∣∣ β], g = h, γ = opHh,p([gv ∣∣ β]), (32)[
x, p,hv , p′
∣∣ γ ] if α = [x,hv , y ∣∣ β], x = p′, y = p, γ = opHh,p([y | β]), (33)[
hv
∣∣ γ ] if α = [p′,hv , p ∣∣ β], opHh,p([p | β]) = [p | γ ], (34)[
x, p,hv
∣∣ γ ] if α = [x,hv , p ∣∣ β], x = p′, opHh,p([p | β]) = [p | γ ], (35)[
hv , p′, y
∣∣ γ ] if α = [p′,hv , y ∣∣ β], y = p, γ = opHh,p([y | β]). (36)
After a careful reading, it can be observed that conditions (33)–(36) correspond to movements (1R), (1L), (2R) and (2L).
As we can see, opH operator processes triples x, hv , y in the list whose central element is a crossing through the moved
hole h. Note that these movements exhaust all the possibilities: x and y could be the target face p, its opposite face p′ or
none of them, but all the cases are covered in (33)–(36). Note also that the last element in a triple is being used as the ﬁrst
element of the next triple. This means that elementary movements can be combined, as shown by the following example,
extracted14 from a similar puzzle explained in Section 7.
Example 3 (Combined movements). Assume we have the list α =:[
H1+,Ring−, H2+,Ring+, H1−,Ring−, H2+
]
.
The result corresponding to pass(Ring, H2+), that is, opHRing,H2+ (α), is computed as shown below. We just show relevant
steps involving some change in the list. At each step, we show the movement to be applied embracing the three involved
crossings. The accumulated result is shown as a second appended list. When new crossings appear, they are shown in
boldface:
[
H1+,Ring−, H2+,Ring+, H1−,Ring−, H2+︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2R)
] · [ ]
[
H1+,Ring−, H2+,Ring+, H1−︸ ︷︷ ︸
(1R)
] · [H2+,Ring−]
[
H1+,Ring−, H2+︸ ︷︷ ︸
(2R)
] · [H2+,Ring+,H2−, H1−, H2+,Ring−]
[ ] · [H1+, H2+,Ring−, H2+,Ring+, H2−, H1−, H2+,Ring−].
Conjecture 1. Let Γ be an HST scenario, M a model of Γ , x a long object and s a ground situation such that chain(x, s) is deﬁned w.r.t.
M. Then:
1. If M | ¬Imposs(pass(t, p), s) then chain(x,do(pass(t, p)), s) = opTt,p(chain(x, s));
2. If M | ¬Imposs(pass(h, p), s) then chain(x,do(pass(h, p)), s) = opHh,p(chain(x, s)).
Conjecture 1 above shall be formally proved in a future work.
We have built a forward planner holestrings (see Appendix A) that tries all action executions in an iterative deep-
ening strategy, using operators opH and opT and exclusively considering the lists of crossings for representing each state.
Notice that, from the planner point of view, the Fisherman’s Folly goal consists now in checking that no lists of crossings
contains a face like Ringv . The planner cannot obtain any solution with less than six action executions. Fig. 11 presents the
ﬁrst solution obtained by the planner in six steps, and shows the executed actions together with each intermediate state for
the chain lists.15 A graphical representation is also included.
14 List α is a portion of chain(Str) at state s3 in Fig. 15.
15 For the sake of readability, we omitted the object tips x− and x+ which should respectively occur as ﬁrst and last element of each list chain(x).
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7. A second puzzle: Rope Ladder
In this section we brieﬂy present a second strings & holes puzzle, named Rope Ladder (Fig. 12). Rope Ladder can be seen
as a more complex variant of Fisherman’s Folly, containing the same sort of objects, entangled in a rigid U-shaped object.
The ring in the initial state of this puzzle is trapped in the horizontal edge of the U-shaped ﬁgure, whose vertical edges are
holed posts, each of which resembles the single post in the Fisherman’s puzzle. The string makes a zig-zag from one post
hole to the other (see state S0 in Fig. 13), crossing each hole twice in the initial state. There are two holed spheres (that
can slide through the string), initially lying near the tips of the string, each of these tips is linked to a disk. The constraints
are analogous to those stated in the previous domain: the spheres cannot pass through either post-holes, where the ring
and disks have free passage, if the hole isn’t already crossed by another object.
A formalisation of the Rope Ladder puzzle, along with its automated solution, is analogous to that developed for Fisher-
man’s Folly. We have in this case the sorts:
Regular= {Disk1,Disk2},
Hole= {Ring, Sphere1, Sphere2, H1, H2}, and
Long= {Str,Post} (37)
where H1 and H2 stand for the two post holes, Post represents the U-shaped object (without its holes) that is of long
object sort. Instead of (FF1), (FF2) and (FF3), we include now the domain dependent axioms:
Holds
(
linked
(
Str−,Disk1
)
,True, S0
) ∧ Holds(linked(Str+,Disk2),True, S0)∧ Holds(linked(Post−, H1),True, S0)
∧ Holds(linked(Post+, H2),True, S0), (RL1)
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CannotPass(disk, sphere,∅) ∧ CannotPass(disk,Ring,∅)
∧ CannotPass(Post, sphere,∅) ∧ CannotPass(Post,postH,∅)
∧ CannotPass(sphere,postH,∅) ∧ cannotPass(sphere, sphere′,∅)
∧ CannotPass(sphere,Ring, {Post})∧ CannotPass(postH, sphere,∅)
∧ CannotPass(Ring, sphere,∅) (RL2)
with disk varying on {Disk1,Disk2}, sphere, sphere′ on {Sphere1, Sphere2}, and postH on {H1, H2}.
Holds
(
next(Str,0),1, S0
) ∧ Holds(towards(Str,0), Sphere1+, S0)
∧ Holds(next(Str,1),2, S0)∧ Holds(towards(Str,1), H1+, S0)
∧ Holds(next(Str,2),3, S0)∧ Holds(towards(Str,2), H2+, S0)
∧ Holds(next(Str,3),4, S0)∧ Holds(towards(Str,3), H1−, S0)
∧ Holds(next(Str,4),5, S0)∧ Holds(towards(Str,4), H2+, S0)
∧ Holds(next(Str,5),6, S0)∧ Holds(towards(Str,5), Sphere2+, S0)
∧ Holds(next(Str,6),End, S0)
∧ Holds(next(Post,0),1, S0)∧ Holds(towards(Post,0),Ring+, S0)
∧ Holds(next(Post,1),End, S0). (RL3)
The reduced number of changes in the formalisation of Fisherman’s Folly to account for Rope Ladder is an indication
that our formal solution to the former respects Elaboration Tolerance [22], at least in what concerns the representation of
different physical conﬁgurations.
The solution of the Rope Ladder puzzle is sketched in Figs. 13 and 14 below, a list-based description of the states in this
solution is shown in Fig. 15.
8. Discussion
In this work we investigated a logic-based formalisation of a domain that involves qualitative spatial reasoning about
non-trivial physical objects (such as strings and holes) and reasoning about actions and change on these objects. The domain
chosen is the spatial puzzle named Fisherman’s Folly, whose goal is to ﬁnd a sequence of actions that applied to the puzzle’s
objects will disentangle a ring from a complex arrangement of a string, rigid objects and holes through them.
The endeavour of formalising the Fisherman’s Folly puzzle is in line with the challenges for common sense reasoning16
such as the egg cracking problem [46–48], whose logical formalisations were motivated by McCarthy’s seminal papers [21,
17]. From a very abstract level, automated solutions to such domains could be obtained from a simple search on a state
16 A list of such challenges can be found on the Common sense problem page: http://www-formal.stanford.edu/leora/commonsense/ (last accessed in
10/12/2009).
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state chain(p) chain(str) next action(s)
S0 [Ring+] [Sphere1+, H1+, H2+, H1−, H2+, Sphere2+] pass({Str+,Disk2}, H2−)
s1 [Ring+] [Sphere1+, H1+, H2+, H1−, H2+, Sphere2+, H2−] pass({H2,Post+},Ring−)
s2 [ ] [Sphere1+, H1+,Ring−, H2+,Ring+, H1−,Ring−, H2+,Ring+, Sphere2+,Ring−, H2,Ring+] pass({Sphere2},Ring−)
s3 [ ] [Sphere1+, H1+,Ring−, H2+,Ring+, H1−,Ring−, H2+, Sphere2+, H2−] pass({Ring}, H2+)
s4 [ ] [Sphere1+, H1+, H2+,Ring−, H2+,Ring+, H2−, H1−, H2+,Ring−, Sphere2+,Ring+, H2−] pass({Sphere2},Ring+)
s5 [ ] [Sphere1+, H1+, H2+,Ring−, H2+,Ring+, H2−, H1−, H2+, Sphere2+, H2−] pass({Ring}, H2−)
s6 [ ] [Sphere1+, H1+,Ring−, H2+,Ring+, H1−, H2+, Sphere2+, H2−] pass({Ring}, H1−)
s7 [ ] [Sphere1+,Ring−, H1+, H2+, H1−,Ring+, H2+, Sphere2+, H2−] pass({H1,Post−},Ring+)
s8 [Ring−] [Sphere1+, H1+,Ring−, H2+,Ring+, H1−, H2+, Sphere2+, H2−] pass({H2,Post+},Ring+)
s9 [ ] [Sphere1+, H1+, H2+, H1−,Ring+, H2+,Ring−, Sphere2+,Ring+, H2,Ring+] pass({Sphere2},Ring+)
s10 [ ] [Sphere1+, H1+, H2+,Ring−, H1−,Ring+, H2+, Sphere2+, H2−] pass({Ring}, H2+)
s11 [ ] [Sphere1+, H1+, H2+, H1−, H2+,Ring+, Sphere2+,Ring−, H2−] pass({Sphere2},Ring−)
s12 [ ] [Sphere1+, H1+, H2+, H1−, H2+, Sphere2+, H2−]
Fig. 15. A formal solution to the Rope Ladder puzzle.
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a number of implicit (hard-wired) assumptions on reasoning about the domain, which are brought to light by a logical
representation. An example of such assumptions is present in the so-called Yale Shooting Scenario [13], a simple domain
that proved to be an elusive problem in the formalisation of commonsense knowledge, due to the fact that its formal
descriptions allowed the existence of counter-intuitive models. Nevertheless, it is possible to hand code a correct state-
transition solution for this scenario (such the one shown in Fig. 5). However, it turns out that this solution is a consequence
of sound reasoning about the domain, as it is the intended model of a correct logical encoding of the scenario. The problem
here is how a logic could derive only the intended models (and not possible counter-intuitive ones), a problem that has
motivated the development of non-monotonic logics [11]. We presented in Section 4 a formalism that solves this problem.
In Sections 5 and 6 we used the proposed formalism to solve the Fisherman’s Folly puzzle and, further, this solution is
illustrated with a list-based model of the logical reasoning process. The connection between the list-based model and the
logic formalisation of the puzzle is analogous to that relating the state-transition description of the Yale Shooting Scenario
with its formal description: the list-based solution of the Fisherman’s Folly puzzle carry strong assumptions on reasoning
about the domain, which its logical description makes clear. In particular, the logic formalisation of the puzzle solves the
problem of deﬁning which parts of a list are not changed, by incorporating a commonsense law of inertia within the stable
model semantics underlying the formalism developed.
Another advantage of using logic (over the direct application of a state transition system) for problem solving is its
ﬂexibility in handling elaborations of the domain: including a new transition in an automaton may imply on changing
completely its structure (let alone the inclusion of indirect effects or continuous change, for instance), whereas – in principle
– logic allows this to be done by adding the related axioms. In fact, much research has been done to equip logic with the
proper tools to accomplish robust and eﬃcient knowledge representation [7,6,8,9]. In this paper we follow the streamline
of this research that tackles the solution of the various problems in knowledge representation assuming Situation Calculus
(handling ﬂuents and actions) and Equilibrium Logic (for correctly dealing with non-monotonicity) [18] as lingua franca.
Although the approach presented in this paper could solve a few puzzles of distinct complexities, there are situations
where a more complex treatment is needed. For instance, the current approach has diﬃculties on the representation of a
holed object crossing another holed object. Instead we assume in this work that the state of a hole crossing another hole
is an intermediate state that exists momentarily (i.e. the state transition is not complete until this crossing holds). Relaxing
this restriction is a matter for future investigations.
Another interesting subject for future work is how to relate the current formalisation to a lower-level representation
based on spatial primitives, opening questions like the “creation” and “destruction” of regions (crossings and segments) or
how to deal with the concept of inertia for spatial change. Clarifying the spatial properties of the puzzle’s objects, such as
the string’s ﬂexibility, and providing the precise reiﬁcation of holes as real objects is the subject of our current research
[25].
It is worth mentioning that the importance of reasoning about strings and holes goes beyond pure theoretical interest,
embracing application domains such as: cabling, where reasoning about ﬂexible and perforated objects is needed for opti-
mising the spatial arrangements of networks of cables; autonomous maintenance of mechanical machines, from which devices
have to be extracted without damaging the surrounding parts. But, perhaps, the most challenging application of reasoning
about strings rely in the ﬁeld of robotic surgery, where autonomous machines have to deal (and plan how to handle) sutures
in situations involving very distinct and delicate structures.
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models which surprisingly, have been recently characterised as a simple modiﬁcation of Circumscription, also ﬁrst proposed
by McCarthy in [19]. Thus, it wouldn’t be much far from the truth if we say that every sentence, every concept, in this
paper was inspired by John’s ideas.
Paulo Santos acknowledges support from FAPESP and CNPq, Brazil. Pedro Cabalar acknowledges support from Spanish
Ministry MEC project TIN2006-15455-C03-02 and Xunta de Galicia project INCITE08-PXIB105159PR.
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Appendix A. Planner
In this section we include the Prolog source for the planner. The program does not contain any domain dependent data,
so it is applicable to Fisherman’s Folly but also to similar puzzles, like the one in the next section (the Rope Ladder). The
additional data for the Fisherman’s Folly scenario is omitted, as it can be easily deduced from (FF1), (FF2) and (FF3).
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shorter solutions, like for instance, cutting the link between the post and its base and then passing Post− to Ring+ .
% SORTS -------------------------------------------------------
object(X) :- long(X); regular(X); hole(X).
sign(+). sign(-).
opposite(X^ +,X^ -). opposite(X^ -,X^ +).
tip(X^V) :- long(X), sign(V).
pole(H^V) :- hole(H), sign(V).
action(pass_t(T,P)):- tip(T),pole(P).
action(pass_h(H,G^V)):- hole(H),pole(G^V), G \= H.
% action(cut(T)):-tip(T).
% UNFEASIBILITY -----------------------------------------------
crossedBy(_H,[],_S):-!.
crossedBy(H,[X|Xs],S):- member(chain(X)=L,S),
member(H^ _,L),!,crossedBy(H,Xs,S).
imposs1(pass_t(X^_,H^_), S):- crossedBy(H,A,S), cannotPass(X,H,A),!.
imposs1(pass_t(T,H^_), S):-
member(linked(T,Y)=true,S), cannotPass(Y,H,A), crossedBy(H,A,S), !.
imposs1(pass_h(H,H2^_), S) :- cannotPass(H,H2,A),crossedBy(H2,A,S), !.
imposs1(cut(T), S) :- member(linked(T,_)=false,S),!.
imposs2(pass_h(H,_), S) :- member(linked(_,H)=true,S),!.
imposs(A,S) :- imposs1(A,S),!; imposs2(A,S).
% EFFECTS -----------------------------------------------------
replace(S0,X=V,S1):- append(Pre,[X=_|Suf],S0), append(Pre,[X=V|Suf],S1).
trans(S0, cut(X^ V), S1):-
!, member(linked(X^ V,Y)=true,S0),
replace(S0,linked(X^ V,Y)=false,S1).
trans(S0, pass_t(X^V,P), S1) :-
!,member(chain(X)=A,S0), opT(X^V,P,A,B),
replace(S0,chain(X)=B,S1).
trans([], pass_h(_,_), []):-!.
trans([chain(X)=A|S0], pass_h(H,P), [chain(X)=B|S1]):-
!, opH(H,P,A,B), trans(S0,pass_h(H,P),S1).
trans([Fact|S0], pass_h(H,P), [Fact|S1]):-
!, trans(S0,pass_h(H,P),S1).
opT(X^ +,P,A,G) :- !, append(B,[Y,X^ +],A),
(opposite(P,Y),!, append(B,[X^ +],G) % (PR)
; append(B,[Y,P,X^ +],G)). % (PL)
opT(X^ -,P,[X^ -,P|B],[X^ -|B]) :- !. % (NL)
opT(X^ -,P,[X^ -,Y|B],[X^ -,P1,Y|B]) :- !,opposite(P,P1). % (NR)
opH(_,_, [X],[X]) :- !.
opH(H,P, [X,G^V|B],[X|D]) :- G\=H,!,opH(H,P, [G^V|B],D).
opH(H,P, [X,H^V,Y|B],[X,P,H^V,P1|G]) :-
opposite(P,P1), X \= P1, Y \= P, !, opH(H,P, [Y|B],G). % (1R)
opH(H,P, [P1,H^V,P|B], [H^V|G]) :-
opposite(P,P1),!,opH(H,P, [P|B],L), L=[P|G]. % (1L)
opH(H,P, [X,H^V,P|B],[X,P,H^V|G]) :-
opposite(P,P1), X \= P1, !, opH(H,P, [P|B],L), L=[P|G]. % (2R)
opH(H,P, [P1,H^V,Y|B], [H^V,P1|G]) :- % (2L)
opposite(P,P1),Y \= P,!,opH(H,P, [Y|B],G).
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execute(S,[]) :- !, write_state(S).
execute(S,[A|As]) :- !,
write_state(S),nl,write(’ACTION: ’),write(A),nl,
(imposs1(A,S),!,write(imposs(A)),nl,fail
; trans(S,A,S1),execute(S1,As)
).
% PLANNING: DEPTH-FIRST ITERATIVE DEEPENING -------------------
find_plan(MinDepth,MaxDepth,Sol):-
initial(S0),iterate_depth(MinDepth,MaxDepth,S0,Sol).
iterate_depth(N,Limit,_,_):-N>Limit,!,fail.
iterate_depth(N,Limit,S0,Sol):-
write(’Trying depth ’),write(N),nl,
get_plan(N,[S0],[],Sol)
; M is N+1, iterate_depth(M,Limit,S0,Sol).
get_plan(_N,[S0|Ss],Plan,([S0|Ss],Plan)):- is_goal(S0),nl.
get_plan(N,_,P,_):-length(P,M),M>=N,!,fail.
get_plan(N,[S0|Ss],Plan0,Sol):-
action(A),
check_undo_actions(A,Plan0),
\+ imposs(A,S0),
check_linked_action(S0,A,S1,A2),
trans(S1,A,S2),
\+ violated_constraint(S2),
get_plan(N,[S2,S0|Ss],[A2|Plan0],Sol).
% If we passed an object tip linked to a hole, we pass the hole too
check_linked_action(S1,pass_t(T,P),S2,pass_t(T,P)+pass_h(H,P)):-
member(linked(T,H)=true,S1),hole(H),!,trans(S1,pass_h(H,P),S2).
check_linked_action(S1,A,S1,A).
% Reject states with two repeated crossings... h+,h+
violated_constraint(S) :-
member(chain(_Y)=L,S), append(_Pre,[X,X|_Suf],L).
opposite_action(pass_t(T,P),pass_t(T,P1)):-opposite(P,P1).
opposite_action(pass_h(X,P),pass_h(X,P1)):-opposite(P,P1).
check_undo_actions(A,[A1|_]):-!,\+ opposite_action(A,A1).
check_undo_actions(_,_).
write_solution((T,P)):-
reverse(T,T1),reverse(P,P1),
write_states(T1,P1).
write_states([],_):-!.
write_states([S],[]):-write_state(S).
write_states([S|Ss],[A|As]):-
write_state(S),write_action(A),write_states(Ss,As).
write_state(S):-member(chain(X)=L,S),write(chain(X)=L),nl,fail.
write_state(_):-nl.
write_action(A):-write(’ACTION: ’),write(A),nl.
goal :- find_plan(0,7,K),write_solution(K).
Appendix B. Proofs
For proving Proposition 7 we will ﬁrst use some properties of QEL that will allow us to convert YALE into an equivalent
theory with the syntactic form of a normal logic program containing function symbols and variables. This normal program
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system shown in Fig. 5.
Proof of Proposition 3. Proved in [50]. 
Proposition 11. For any interpretation 〈(D, σ ), H, T 〉 and any formula ϕ , we have 〈(D, σ ), H, T 〉 | ϕ implies 〈(D, σ ), T 〉 | ϕ .
Proof. It easily follows by structural induction. 
Proposition 12. 〈(D, σ ), H, T 〉 | ¬ϕ is equivalent to 〈(D, σ ), T 〉 | ¬ϕ .
Proof. By simply checking the conditions for satisfaction in HT . 
Lemma 1. The formula α : (ψ → ϕ) → ¬(ψ ∧ ¬ϕ) is an HT-tautology.
Proof. For any interpretation M = 〈(D, σ ), H, T 〉 we must prove both 〈(D, σ ), T 〉 | α and that M | (ψ → ϕ) implies M |
¬(ψ ∧ ¬ϕ). The ﬁrst condition follows from the fact that α is a classical tautology. Assume now that M | (ψ → ϕ). This
implies 〈(D, σ ), T 〉 | ψ → ϕ in classical logic, and this is equivalent to 〈(D, σ ), T 〉 | ¬(ψ ∧ ¬ϕ) which, in its turn, is
equivalent to M | ¬(ψ ∧ ¬ϕ) by Proposition 12. 
Lemma 2. The following formula is an HT-tautology:
ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ → ((ψ → ϕ) ↔ ¬(ψ ∧ ¬ϕ)). (B.1)
Proof. For any interpretation M = 〈(D, σ ), H, T 〉 we would have to prove that both: 〈(D, σ ), T 〉 | (B.1); and M | ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ
implies M | (ψ → ϕ) ↔ ¬(ψ ∧ ¬ϕ). The ﬁrst condition is trivial, since (B.1) is a classical tautology. To prove the second
condition, assume M satisﬁes ϕ ∨ ¬ϕ . By Lemma 1, the left to right direction of the equivalence (ψ → ϕ) → ¬(ψ ∧ ¬ϕ) is
an HT-tautology. For the right to left direction, it is clear that 〈(D, σ ), T 〉 | (ψ → ϕ) ← ¬(ψ ∧ ¬ϕ) since this is a classical
tautology. Assume now that M | ¬(ψ ∧ ¬ϕ). By Proposition 12 this is equivalent to 〈(D, σ ), T 〉 | ¬(ψ ∧ ¬ϕ) that in its
turn is equivalent to 〈(D, σ ), T 〉 | (ψ → ϕ). We remain to prove that M | ψ implies M | ϕ . Assume M | ψ but M | ϕ .
From the latter and M | ϕ ∨¬ϕ we conclude M | ¬ϕ . By Proposition 12 this is equivalent to 〈(D, σ ), T 〉 | ¬ϕ and, as we
had 〈(D, σ ), T 〉 | (ψ → ϕ) we get 〈(D, σ ), T 〉 | ψ that by Proposition 11 implies M | ψ reaching a contradiction. 
Proof of Proposition 5. Since (DE) asserts that equality satisﬁes the excluded middle x = y ∨ ¬(x = y), we can apply
Lemma 2 to obtain that ϕ → x = y is HT-equivalent to ¬(ϕ ∧ x = y). But, by Proposition 4, the latter is HT-equivalent
to ϕ ∧ x = y → ⊥. 
Proof of Proposition 6. Independently shown in [42,43]. 
Proof of Proposition 7. Note ﬁrst that YALE has the form of a logic program excepting for the use of an existential quantiﬁer
in (INE), (DV) and (DV0) and the use of conjunction in (8) and (9). Using the propositions in Section 3 and previous results
in this appendix, we can transform YALE into a logic program, we can then consider Π = grD(YALE), that is, the (inﬁnite)
ground logic program resulting from replacing variables by all terms in the Herbrand universe D . An important observation
is that this program can be split in the sense of the Splitting Theorem in [51], as any ground atom for Holds or Imposs
indexed by a situation s never depends17 on an atom indexed by do(a, s). Furthermore, atoms for do(a, s) and do(a′, s) with
a = a′ do not even depend on each other. This allows us to construct an inductive proof on the structure of situation terms.
For instance, the initial state for situation S0 is uniquely ﬁxed by (9). Then, by the splitting theorem, we can independently
compute the states for do(load, S0), do(wait, S0) and do(shoot, S0) considering their corresponding ground rules.
We have implemented these 1-transition programs into lparse/smodels. The resulting programs can be seen in Figs. 16
and 17. From their execution we obtain all possible single transitions leading to the successor states of S0 in Fig. 5. Then
we could move to consider all situations with two actions do(wait,do(load, S0)), do(load,do(load, S0)), . . . , and so on. The
complete formal proof would actually consist in assuming that the correspondence to the ﬁgure holds for all situations
terms with n actions do(an,do(an−1, . . . ,do(a1, S0) . . .)) and applying splitting to prove it for terms with n + 1 actions.
Finally, note that we get a unique state for S0 and all transitions are deterministic. This shows that YALE has a unique
equilibrium model. 
17 An atom p depends on an atom q if there exists a rule with p occurring in its head and q in its body.
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#domain situation(S).
#domain fluent(F).
#domain inertial(IF).
#domain noninertial(NIF).
#domain action(A).
% Types of fluents
fluent(IF).
fluent(NIF).
% We only consider 1 transition
situation(s0).
situation(do(A,s0)).
% Unique value (UV)
:- holds(F,S,V), holds(F,S,W), V != W,
range(F,V), range(F,W).
% Inertia (INE)
holds(IF,do(A,s0),V) :- not imposs(A,s0),
holds(IF,s0,V),
not released(IF,s0),
not ab(IF,V,A,s0),
range(IF,V).
ab(IF,V,A,s0) :- holds(IF,do(A,s0),W), W!=V,
range(IF,V), range(IF,W).
% Default values (DV)
holds(NIF,S,V) :- not ab2(NIF,S,V), default(NIF,V), range(NIF,V).
ab2(NIF,S,V) :- holds(NIF,S,W), W!=V, range(NIF,V), range(NIF,W).
% Default values for inertial fluents (DV0)
holds(IF,s0,V) :- not ab3(IF,s0,V), default(IF,V), range(IF,V).
ab3(IF,s0,V) :- holds(IF,s0,W), W!=V, range(IF,V), range(IF,W).
% ’defined’ predicate
defined(F,S) :- holds(F,S,V), range(F,V).
Fig. 16. Axioms of ESC for a single transition, from S0 to do(A, S0), represented in an lparse/smodels program.
Appendix C. A third puzzle: the Tricky Dick
The Tricky Dick© is a puzzle designed by Richard Earson that was presented in the International Puzzle Party, London
1999. The puzzle, shown in Fig. 18, consists of:
• two wooden cylinders of different length connected in their bottom by a tiny piece of string,
• a pair of metallic rings of different diameter (the large one cannot pass through the small one),
• a string loop linked to the top of the small cylinder and embracing the large cylinder,
• and ﬁnally, a string linked to the top of the large cylinder, crossing through the small ring and linked to the large
ring.
As in the other puzzles, the goal is removing the small ring, so it gets free from the rest of the puzzle.
In order to formalise the puzzle we will make several simplifying assumptions. For instance, although the cylinders can
pass through the large ring, after playing a while with the puzzle we may soon discover that the real role of this piece is
to be a top for the small ring. Thus, for the sake of simplicity, we will consider the large ring as a regular object, ignoring
its hole.
A second simplifying assumption is considering the two cylinders and the tiny string that links them in their bottom as
a single piece. In fact, the mobility of this part of the puzzle is practically null and so, is equivalent to a single ‘U’-shaped
wooden piece.
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% We define sorts for fluent values.
% In this case, just Boolean fluents
boolean(true;false).
% We define the fluents
inertial(loaded).
range(loaded,Bool) :- boolean(Bool).
inertial(alive).
range(alive,Bool) :- boolean(Bool).
% We define the set of actions
action(load).
action(shoot).
action(wait).
% Executability axioms
imposs(load,S) :- holds(loaded,S,true).
imposs(shoot,S) :- holds(loaded,S,false).
% Effect axioms
holds(loaded,do(load,s0),true) :- not imposs(load,s0).
holds(alive,do(shoot,s0),false) :- not imposs(shoot,s0).
holds(loaded,do(shoot,s0),false) :- not imposs(shoot,s0).
% Initial state generation
1 { holds(F,s0,VAL) : range(F,VAL) } 1.
hide.
show holds(X1,X2,X3).
Fig. 17. YALE represented in an lparse/smodels program.
Fig. 18. The Tricky Dick puzzle.
Finally, the role of the string loop is quite different from the way in which we handle the longest string. Since this loop
is permanently ﬁxed, it can be actually seen as a (ﬂexible) holed object.18
To sum up, the sorts for this scenario would correspond to:
Regular= {LargeRing},
Hole= {Ring, Loop}, and
Long= {Str,Post} (C.1)
where Post represents the U-shaped object formed by the cylinders and the tiny string. The initial state of the puzzle can
be schematically represented by situation S0 in Fig. 19.
The domain dependent axioms would be:
Holds
(
linked
(
Str−,Post+
)
,True, S0
) ∧ Holds(linked(Str+, LargeRing),True, S0)
∧ Holds(linked(Post−, Loop),True, S0), (TD1)
18 In fact, this is directly related to one of the topics we are currently considering for immediate future work: linking the two tips of a string or making
a knot in it forms a string loop that can be handled as a holed object (we can deﬁne two faces, pass objects through the loop, etc.).
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S0 [Loop+] [Ring−] pass({Ring}, Loop+)
s1 [Loop+] [Loop+,Ring−, Loop−] pass({Str−,Post+},Ring+)
s2 [Loop+,Ring+] [Ring−, Loop+,Ring−, Loop−] pass({Ring}, Loop−)
s3 [Ring+, Loop+] [Loop−,Ring−, Loop+,Ring−] pass({Loop,Post−},Ring−)
s4 [Ring+, Loop+,Ring+] [Ring−, Loop−,Ring−, Loop+] pass({Post+, Str−},Ring−)
s5 [Ring+, Loop+] [Loop−,Ring−, Loop+] pass({Ring}, Loop+)
s6 [Loop+,Ring+] [Ring−] pass({Post+, Str−},Ring−)
s7 [Loop+] [ ]
Fig. 20. A formal solution to the Tricky Dick puzzle.
CannotPass(LargeRing,Ring,∅) ∧ CannotPass(LargeRing, Loop,∅), (TD2)
Holds
(
next(Str,0), S0,1
) ∧ Holds(towards(Str,0), S0,Ring−)
∧ Holds(next(Str,1), S0,End)
∧ Holds(next(Post,0), S0,1)∧ Holds(towards(Post,0), S0, Loop+)
∧ Holds(next(Post,1), S0,End). (RL3)
The solution is shown in Figs. 19 and 20, that respectively contain the graphical representation and the complete inter-
mediate states (in terms of chain lists).
The real interesting feature of this puzzle is that state s5 is not actually feasible in the real device due to rigidness of
the post (i.e. the cylinders). The real puzzle solution implies a combined movement: the right side of the ring is rotated
pivoting on its left side and simultaneously embracing Post+ and the Loop. However, the effects of this combined movement
exactly correspond to state s6 where we “virtually” decompose this action into ﬁrst passing the loop and Post− , and then
passing Post+ in a second step. 
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